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THE COMPATIBILITY OF A FEDERAL
MAGISTRATE'S FINAL JUDGMENT WITH
NONMUTUAL ISSUE PRECLUSION
The legislature and the judiciary act responsibly When they provide
and explore new, flexible methods of adjudication, especially where
the evolution of the innovative mechanism is left in large part
under the control of the judiciary itself.'
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy
I. Introduction
The Federal Magistrate Act of 19792 (the Act) expanded the
responsibility of federal magistrates,3 empowering them to try civil
1. Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d
537, 547 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984) (decision on
constitutionality of Magistrate Act of 1979).
2. Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3060, 3401-3402 (1982); 28 U.S.C. §§ 604, 631-639 (1982)).
3. The Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3060, 3401-3402 (1968); 28 U.S.C. §§ 604,
631-639 (1968)), abolished the office of United States commissioners and established the
United States magistrate system. The purpose of the 1968 Act was to "reform the
first echelon of the Federal judiciary into an effective component of a modern
scheme of justice." H.R. REP. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 [hereinafter
H.R. REP. No. 1629], reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4252,
4253-54. The 1968 Act raised the standards of the office and increased the re-
sponsibility given to magistrates. H.R. REP. No. 1629, supra, at 11-12, reprinted
in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4252, 4254-55.
The 1976 Federal Magistrate Act, Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1976)), focused on the magistrate's role in conducting pretrial
proceedings. The jurisdictional amendments were enacted to clarify the use of
magistrates after an adverse United States Supreme Court decision in Wingo v.
Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974). See H.R. REP. No. 1609, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6162, 6164-65.
The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643, expanded
the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the United States magistrates. Magistrates were
given the power "to dispose of certain minor criminal cases by including all Federal
misdemeanors within their jurisdiction," and were also given "case dispositive
jurisdiction ... in civil cases where the parties to the litigation consent to the
exercise of such power by the magistrate." S. REP. No. 74, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
1 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 74], reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 1469, 1469.
Even before the 1979 statutory enlargement of power, United States magistrates
had been conducting civil trials upon the consent of the parties in certain juris-
dictions. See The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979: Hearing on S. 237 Before the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1979) (statement of Hon. Otto R. Skopil, Jr.,
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cases and enter final judgments provided there is consent by the
parties and district court reference.4 The Act provides for a "sup-
plementary judicial power designed to meet the ebb and flow of
the demands made on the federal judiciary." 5 By enlarging the
jurisdiction of magistrates, the Act improves access to the federal
courts, particularly for less-advantaged parties.6 It also relieves federal
judges from hearing certain types of cases and thus allows them to
devote more time to presiding over trials and writing opinions, thereby
conserving scarce judicial resources.'
Similarly, the doctrine of issue preclusion, like the related doctrine
of claim preclusion, has the effect of conserving judicial resources
by preventing needless relitigation.8 Issue preclusion mandates that
Chief Judge, United States District Court, Portland, Or.); McCabe, The Federal
Magistrate Act of 1979, 16 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 343, 359-61 (1979) [hereinafter
McCabe]. The Act of 1979 explicitly permits such jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) (1982).
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1982).
5. H.R. REP. No. 1364, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978).
6. See S. REP. No. 74, supra note 3, at 4, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 1469, 1472.
[T]he less-advantaged . . .lack the resources to cope with the vicissitudes
of adjudication delay and expense. If their civil cases are forced out of
court as a result, they lose all their procedural safeguards .... The
imaginative supply of magistrate services can help the system cope and
prevent inattention to a mounting queue of civil cases pushed to the
back of the docket.
Id. While this result seems desirable, critics have argued that the effect could
be discriminatory-magistrates will be reserved for the poor while district court
judges preside over cases involving litigants who can afford article III delays and
costs. See Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d
537, 553-54 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (Schroeder, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
824 (1984); Note, Article III Constraints and the Expanding Civil Jurisdiction of
Federal Magistrates: A Dissenting View, 88 YALE L.J. 1023, 1052-53 (1979) [here-
inafter Note, Article III Constraints]. While considering the constitutionality of the
1979 Magistrate Act, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that such
a possibility was speculative and unlikely, drawing a comparison to the use of
arbitrators which occurs regardless of the parties' wealth. See Geras v. Lafayette
Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir. 1984).
7. See McCabe, supra note 3, at 356.
8. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); Montana v. United States,
440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
"Res judicata" refers to the two ways in which a prior adjudication can have
a binding effect in a later court action. The judgment rendered in the prior action
can either prevent the relitigation of claims (res judicata) or the relitigation of
issues (collateral estoppel). See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.3,
at 532 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter F. JAMES & G. HAZARD]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 17 (1982) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)]. An oft-quoted
passage illustrates the distinction:
[In res judicata], the judgment, if rendered upon the merits, constitutes
an absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is a finality as to the claim
[Vol. XV
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once an essential issue 9 has been actually litigated' ° and finally
determined," the determination is conclusive in a subsequent suit,
whether that suit is on the same or a different claim.' 2 Precluding
relitigation serves to "relieve parties of the cost and vexation of
multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing
inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication." 3
The increasing use of magistrates in lieu of federal district judges'4
is currently accompanied by an expansive interpretation of issue
preclusion. 5 As a result, a situation may arise in which a magistrate
or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with
them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to
sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible
matter which might have been offered for that purpose .... Such demand
or claim, having passed into judgment, cannot again be brought into
litigation between the parties in proceedings at law upon any ground
whatever.
But where the second action between the same parties is upon a different
claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel
only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the
determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered.
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1877); see also Lawlor v. National
Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955) (describing difference between res
judicata and collateral estoppel); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597-98
(1948) (same).
Due to the potential confusion that may arise when the broad concept of res
judicata is used to include the narrower concepts of res judicata and collateral
estoppel, many commentators have chosen to refer to the narrower doctrines as
claim preclusion and issue preclusion, respectively. See, e.g., F. JAMES & G. HAZARD,
supra, § 11.4, at 553; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra, § 27; 18 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4402, at 6-11 (1981)
[hereinafter WIarr, FEDERAL PRACTICE]; Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables:
Adjudicating Bodies, 54 GEO. L.J. 857 (1966) [hereinafter Vestal]. This Note employs
the terminology used by these commentators.
9. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 8, § 11.19, at 569-71 (issues not
necessary to support judgment are not accorded preclusive effect because: (1) issues
are not focus of parties' attentions; (2) issues most likely do not receive full judicial
consideration; (3) unnecessary determinations usually are not subject to appeal).
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 27 comment d (issue is actually
litigated when it is "properly raised, by the pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted
for determination, and is determined").
11. See id. § 13.
12. See id. § 27.
13. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
14. From 1983 to 1984, magistrates' civil case disposition increased 13.4 percent.
See [19841 DiR. ADMIN. OFF. U.S. Crs. ANN. REP. 207.' Magistrates disposed of 3,717
civil cases on consent of the parties in 1985, an increase of 4.8 percent over the
3,546 cases disposed of in 1984. See LAW & BusiNEss, INC., THE LAWYER'S ALMANAC
826 (1986).
15. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982); Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
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enters a final judgment and a nonparty seeks to estop a party from
relitigating the underlying issues in a federal district court. If the
trial court denies the party the opportunity to relitigate in the second
suit, a magistrate's determination may have the effect of determining
issues in, and possibly the outcome of, subsequent litigation, even
though the parties in the subsequent suit have not consented to a
magistrate trial and have demanded article III adjudication. 16
This Note examines the propriety of issue preclusion as applied
to a magistrate's factual determination. Initially, this Note provides
an overview of section 636(c) of the Magistrate Act of 1979 and
decisions holding its provisions constitutional. v It then briefly looks
at the expanded use of issue preclusion, which is largely due to the
elimination of the mutuality requirement."s Following an analysis of
the consent given by the parties, 9 and an examination of whether
various policies are promoted by this use of issue preclusion, 20 this
Note recommends that nonmutual issue preclusion should apply to
a magistrate's determination in a civil trial only if the parties are
aware of the consequences that may result when they consent. 2'
II. Section 636(c) of the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979
Section 636(c) of the Federal Magistrate Act gives broad powers
to magistrates in civil trials, authorizing them to conduct "any or
all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry
of judgment in the case," provided that the district court designates
the magistrat e to exercise civil trial jurisdiction, and the parties
consent to have a magistrate try their case.22 The Act does not,
16. Article III, section I of the United States Constitution states:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at
stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not
be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The "good Behaviour" clause has been interpreted to
give judges life tenure, subject only to removal by impeachment. See United States
ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955).
17. See infra notes 22-46 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text. This Note considers only the
doctrine of issue preclusion.
19. See infra notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 72-86 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 87-101 and accompanying text. This Note examines issue
preclusion as applied to a magistrate's factual determination in a consensual civil
trial.
22. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1982).
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however, protect magistrates with the lifetime tenure and irreducible
salary provisions contained in article III of the United States Con-
stitution: 23 (1) their appointment is for four or eight years;2 4 (2) they
can be removed by the judges of the district court in which the
magistrate serves, 5 or in some cases by the judicial council of the
circuit;26 and (3) their salary can be reduced by an act of Congress.2 7
Critics argue that pursuant to section 636(c) magistrates are ex-
ercising the judicial power of article 11128 without enjoying its tenure
and salary provisions, thereby thwarting the institution of an in-
dependent judiciary that the framers of the Constitution intended
by these article III provisions. 29 Nevertheless, twelve of the thirteen
23. See supra note 16.
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 631(e) (1982) (full-time magistrates are appointed for terms
of eight years; part-time magistrates serve for terms of four years).
25. See id. § 631(i) ("[rjemoval ; . . shall be only for incompetency, misconduct,
neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability, but a magistrate's office shall be
terminated if the conference determines that the services performed by his office
are no longer needed").
26. See id. (concurrence of majority of judicial council will be used to remove
magistrate if there is tie vote of district court judges on question of removal).
Each judicial council consists of the chief judge of the judicial circuit, the number
of circuit judges fixed by a majority vote of all circuit judges in regular and active
service, and the number of district court judges fixed by a majority vote of all
circuit judges in regular and active service. See id. § 332(a)(1).
27. See id. § 634(a) (Supp. III 1985) (rates cannot exceed those fixed by Section
225 of Federal Salary Act of 1967, 2 U.S.C. §§ 351-361 (1982)). Even though Con-
gress sets the maximum rate of pay, salaries for magistrates are determined by the
judicial conference, see 28 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1982), which consists of the Chief Judge
of the United States, and the chief judge and a district court judge from each judicial
circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1982). The rates for full-time magistrates cannot be
reduced during their terms. See 28 U.S.C. § 634(b) (1982).
28. The judicial power extends to all cases in law and equity arising under the
Constitution, or laws and treaties of the United States; to cases affecting ambas-
sadors, public ministers and consuls; to cases of admiralty; to controversies in
which the United States is a party; and to controversies between states or citizens
of different states. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
29. The article III tenure and salary provisions guarantee an independent judiciary
free from legislative or executive encroachment. See e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58-60 (1982) (provisions provide
"clear institutional protections" for an independent judiciary); O'Donoghue v.
United States, 289 U.S. 516, 529-35 (1933) ("anxiety of the framers of the Con-
stitution to preserve the independence especially of the judicial department is
manifested by the [tenure and salary provisions]"); THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 483
(A. Hamilton) (H. Lodge ed. 1888) (tenure "is the best expedient ... to secure
a steady, upright, and impartial administration of the laws"); id. No. 79, at 491
("[n]ext to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence
of the judges than a fixed provision for their support").
Because magistrates must rely on article III judges for their tenure and Congress
1986-87]
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federal circuits have been faced with the question of the constitu-
tionality of section 636(c) and all have upheld it. 30 Recently, one
for their salary, opponents contend that magistrates are not shielded from any
disaffection or outside pressures. See Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc.,
742 F.2d 1037, 1052-54 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., dissenting); Lehman Bros.
Kuhn Loeb, Inc. v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 739 F.2d 1313, 1319-20 (8th Cir.
1984) (en banc) (Arnold, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158 (1985); Pace-
maker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 548-51
(9th Cir.) (en banc) (Schroeder, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984).
30. K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985); Gairola v.
Virginia Dep't of Gen. Servs., 753 F.2d 1281 (4th Cir. 1985); D.L. Auld Co. v.
Chroma Graphics Corp., 753 F.2d 1029 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 83
(1985); United States v. Dobey, 751 F.2d 1140 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 63 (1985); Fields v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 743 F.2d 890
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037 (7th
Cir. 1984); Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc. v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 739
F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158 (1985); Puryear
v. Ede's Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1984); Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984); Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 852 (1984); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am.,
Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc), rev'g 712 F.2d 1305
(9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984); Wharton-Thomas v. United
States, 721 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1983).
Most of these courts have distinguished the Magistrate Act of 1979 from the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978, which the Supreme Court analyzed in Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). The Bankruptcy Act
of 1978 established a bankruptcy court in each judicial district "as an adjunct to
the district court." 28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1982). The bankruptcy judges, who were
not given life tenure, see id. § 153, or irreducible salaries, see id. § 154, had
jurisdiction over "all civil proceedings arising under title 11 [the Bankruptcy title]
or arising in or related to cases under title 11." Id. § 1471(b). They were subject
to removal by the "judicial council of the circuit" for "incompetency, misconduct,
neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability." Id. § 153(b).
Justice Brennan, writing in Northern Pipeline for a plurality of four justices,
concluded that section 241(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 "impermissibly removed
most, if not all, of 'the essential attributes of the judicial power' from the Art.
III district court, and ... vested those attributes in a non-Art. III adjunct."
Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 87. The plurality first concluded that the bankruptcy
courts were not created pursuant to Congress' article I powers. See id. at 63-76.
It also found that the bankruptcy courts were not proper "adjuncts" to the district
court. See id. at 76-87. The plurality's main concern was with the separation of
powers. It found "unwarranted encroachments upon the judicial power" because
bankruptcy courts would be adjudicating constitutional rights in addition to rights
created by federal statute. Id. at 83-84.
The Second Circuit's analysis of Section 636(c) of the Magistrate Act of 1979
in Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 870 (1984),
illustrates the perceived differences between the two acts:
[T]he . . . factors deemed important in Northern Pipeline are present in
adjudications under section 636(c). First, magistrates "must be specially
designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court [quoting 28
U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1982)]." Second, the method of appointment and
removal of magistrates was not affected by the 1979 Act; both respon-
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circuit even granted attorney's fees to a defendant, based on the
fact that eight circuits had upheld the constitutionality of this section
before the plaintiff had opened its brief on appeal.' The United States
Supreme Court has declined on a number of occasions to review
the circuit courts' rulings upholding section 636(c). 32
Section 636(c) permits a magistrate to enter final judgment. 3
Nevertheless, circuit courts have determined that this section provides
sufficient independent article III control over magistrates to protect
the judiciary from legislative and executive pressures, 3 because of
sibilities continue to be entrusted to the district court. Finally, the district
court retains the power to withdraw the reference. . . . Section 636(c)
• . . does not affect the allocation of power between Congress and the
district courts. The factors that seem to have concerned the Northern
Pipeline plurality-that bankruptcy judges were not appointed by the
district court and could not be removed by the district court, that
bankruptcy courts were vested with independent jurisdiction and that
district courts could not withdraw cases from bankruptcy courts-are
simply not present in adjudications under section 636(c) ....
Id. at 115 (citations omitted).
31. See D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 753 F.2d 1029, 1032-33
(Fed. Cir.) (plaintiff had "no reasonable basis for believing that its constitutional
argument had any likelihood of prevailing"), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 83 (1985).
32. See supra note 30 for instances when the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
The Supreme Court did review the 1976 Amendment to the Magistrate Act which
permits district court judges to refer certain pretrial motions to a magistrate. In
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980), the Court sustained the use of a
magistrate in a motion to suppress evidence, relying mainly on the fact that Section
636(b)(1)(B) of the Magistrate Act requires a district court judge to make a "de
novo determination" of the portions of the magistrate's finding to which a party
has objected, thereby making the judge the "ultimate decisionmaker." Id. at 677-
84. See also Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976) (preliminary review function
assigned to magistrate under § 636(b) is permissible due to fact that district judge
can reject or accept recommendation, thus enabling district judge to make final
determination).
Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion in Raddatz, felt that "the only
conceivable danger of a 'threat' to the 'independence' of the magistrate comes
from within, rather than without, the judicial department" because magistrates are
subject to the control of article III judges. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 685 (Blackmun,
J., concurring). In response to this concern, both the Second Circuit and the Third
Circuit have held that the question of separation of powers does not involve
intrajudiciary pressures. See Collins, 729 F.2d at 115 ("the Northern Pipeline plurality
... explicitly refused to assign any constitutional significance to such internal
pressures"); Wharton-Thomas, 721 F.2d at 927 & n.8 ("[tihere is no reason to even
speculate that district judges would improperly attempt to influence a magistrate's
decision, but any such conduct would implicate due process, rather than Article III").
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1982).
34. See Fields, 743 F.2d at 894; Geras, 742 F.2d at 1042-43; Lehman Bros., 739
F.2d at 1315-16; Collins, 729 F.2d at 114-15; Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 544-46; Wharton-
Thomas, 721 F.2d at 927.
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the appointment and removal powers of the district court" in addition
to particular provisions of section 636(c) that give the district court
the ability to vacate a case reference, 6 and the litigant the right to
a full and automatic appeal to an article III court.37
The section garners most of its support from its requirement of
litigant consent as a prerequisite to a magistrate's determination."
The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of party consent
in referring a case to a non-article III officer since the early nineteenth
century.3 9 This factor has not lost its significance; in a recent Supreme
Court case, Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1982) (appointment powers); id. § 631(i) (removal
powers).
36. See id. § 636(c)(6) (court can cancel reference either sua sponte or "under
extraordinary circumstances shown by any party"),
37. A party may appeal directly to the appropriate court of appeals, see id.
§ 636(c)(3), or, if the parties consent, to a judge of the district court. See id.
§ 636(c)(4). An appeal of a magistrate's decision is reviewed under the identical
standards as an appeal of a district court judge's decision to the court of appeals.
See, e.g., Woods v. United States, 720 F.2d 1451, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1983) (mag-
istrate's finding allowed to stand unless clearly erroneous); Payne v. United States,
711 F.2d 73, 75 (7th Cir. 1983) (same). There is no limitation on a party's right
to seek review by the United States Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(5)
(1982).
38. This requirement of consent is contained in Section 636(c)(1) of Title 28
of the United States Code. Numerous courts and critics have relied on the consent
requirement in determining that Section 636(c) is constitutional. See Lehman Bros.,
739 F.2d at 1315 (holding that Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline was
not controlling because in that case one party objected to adjudication by Bankruptcy
Court, whereas in case at bar both parties had consented to adjudication by
magistrate); Wharton-Thomas, 721 F.2d at 925-26 (same); S. REP. No. 74, supra
note 3, at 4, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 1469, 1473
("[iun light of this requirement of consent, no witness at the hearings on the bill
found any constitutional question that could be raised against the provision");
H.R. REP. No. 287, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-9 (1979) (consent of parties was
sufficient to overcome objections based on constitutional grounds); see also Sil-
berman, Masters and Magistrates Part II: The American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1297, 1350-54 (1975) ("consent greatly increases the permissibility of reference")
[hereinafter Silberman].
39. See Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S. 512, 524 (1889) ("when the parties consent
to the reference of a case to a master or other officer to hear and decide all the
issues ... the master is clothed with very different powers from those which he
exercises upon ordinary references, without such consent"); Newcomb v. Wood,
97 U.S. 581, 583 (1878) ("power of a court of justice, with the consent of the
parties, to appoint arbitrators and refer a case pending before it, is incident to
all judicial administration"); Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123, 128 (1865)
(practice of referring cases to referee with consent of parties "is coeval with the
organization of our judicial system"); Alexandria Canal Co. v. Swann, 46 U.S.
(5 How.) 82, 89 (1847) ("a trial by arbitrators, appointed by the court with the
consent of both parties, is one of the modes of prosecuting a suit to judgment as
well established and as fully warranted by law as a trial by jury").
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Line Co.,40 all the Justices referred to the importance of litigant
consent in determining whether a provision of the Bankruptcy Act
of 1978 violates article III. 4 '
By consenting, litigants are actually waiving their right to an article
III judge. 42 Waiver of this right has been compared to the permissible
waiver by a criminal defendant of a fundamental right.4 3 One can
40. 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (plurality opinion).
41. See id. at 79-80 n.31 (plurality opinion) ("[blefore the [1978 Bankruptcy]
Act the referee had no jurisdiction, except with consent") (emphasis added); id.
at 91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("[nione of the cases has gone so far as to
sanction the type of adjudication to which Marathon will be subjected against its
will under the provisions of the 1978 Act") (emphasis added); id. at 92 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (limiting Court's holding to proposition that " 'traditional' state
common-law action . . . must, absent the consent of the litigants, be heard by an
'Art. III court' if it is to be heard by any court or agency of the United States")
(emphasis added); id. at 95 (White, J., dissenting) (under plurality's interpretation,
state-law claims "would have to be heard by Art. III judges or by state courts-
unless the defendant consents to suit before the bankruptcy judge") (emphasis
added).
42. Some courts have interpreted the consent as waiving a personal right,
conferred by article Ill, to article III adjudication. See Geras, 742 F.2d at 1041;
Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 541-42; -cf. Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of
Federal Judges: Some Notes from History, 36 U. CH. L. REV. 665, 698 (1969)
(tenure provision was "not created for the benefit of the judges, but for the benefit
of the judged").
Other courts have treated the consent as waiving a due process right. See Fields,
743 F.2d at 894; Collins, 729 F.2d at 120; cf. Note, Federal Magistrates and the
Principles of Article III, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1947, 1962-63 (1984) (consent "protects
the Magistrate Act from a constitutional challenge based on the due process clause").
Regardless of the source of the right to article III adjudication, all have concluded
that it can be permissibly waived, distinguishing the waiver from the impermissible
consent to subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Geras, 742 F.2d at 1041-42 ("issue
is not an expansion of the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts but
rather the parties' choice of the forum"); Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 543 ("litigant
waiver in this case is similar to waiver of a defect in jurisdiction over the person,
a waiver federal courts permit").
43. In Pacemaker, the Ninth Circuit stated:
The Supreme Court has allowed criminal defendants to waive even fun-
damental rights: the right to be free from self-incrimination, Garner v.
United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976), the right to counsel, Adams v. United
States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942), the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973), the right to a speedy trial, Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
(1972), the right to a jury trial, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968), and even, by pleading guilty, the right to trial itself. See Boykin
v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). We refuse to reach the anomalous
result of forbidding waiver in a civil case of the personal right to an
Article III judge.
725 F.2d at 543 (parallel citations omitted); see also Dobey, 751 F.2d at 1142
(same); Collins, 729 F.2d at 120 ("Supreme Court has held that important con-
stitutional rights may be waived even in criminal cases, which generally raise more
troubling due process problems").
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compare this waiver to the relinquishment or alteration of a right
as provided for by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." As long
as a party freely and voluntarily consents, 45 it is now firmly estab-
lished that a magistrate can constitutionally exercise civil jurisdic-
tion. 46
III. Issue Preclusion
A recent, expanded use of issue preclusion can be largely attributed
to the abrogation of the mutuality requirement. Traditionally, issue
preclusion was available only when it was "mutual," that is, when
the party invoking the'preclusion was bound by the prior adjudi-
cation.4 7 This requirement of mutuality arose out of an interest in
44. The Third Circuit compared the waiver of an article III judicial officer
under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) to: (1) Federal Rule 38(d), which provides for both the
automatic waiver of a jury trial unless affirmatively exercised, and the withdrawal
of a jury trial if both parties consent; and (2) Federal Rule 39(c), which authorizes
the district court to order a jury trial, provided that both parties consent, when
it is not otherwise triable by right. See Wharton-Thomas, 721 F.2d at 926; see
also FED. R. Civ. P. 48 (parties can stipulate that jury trial shall consist of less
than twelve jurors).
45. The Magistrate Act of 1979 provides that the parties' consent must be
voluntary, and requires that local rules contain provisions to protect the litigants
from coerced consent. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) (1982).
Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure incorporates a "blind consent"
provision to ensure that the litigants' consent is obtained on a voluntary basis.
FED. R. Crv. P. 73(b). It provides that neither the district judge nor the magistrate
shall "be informed of a party's response to the clerk's notification [of the option
to consent], unless all parties have consented to the referral of the matter to a
magistrate." Id. This procedure is intended to protect the nonconsenting party
from any prejudice that might subsequently follow in the trial before the district
judge. See Silberman, supra note 38, at 1359-60. See generally K. SINCLAIR, JR.,
PRACTICE BEFORE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES §§ 23.03 -.05 (1986) (describing consent
procedures) [hereinafter PRACTICE BEFORE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES].
46. The more recent circuit courts of appeals decisions addressing the consti-
tutionality of Section 636(c) simply agree with the earlier circuit decisions and the
courts have refrained from discussing the issue at any length. See K.M. C. Co., 757
F.2d at 755; Gairola, 753 F.2d at 1284-85; D.L. Auld, 753 F.2d at 1031-32.
47. Numerous early Supreme Court decisions required mutuality. See, e.g.,
Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638, 644-45 (1936), overruled by Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971); Bigelow v.
Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912); Keokuk
& W. R.R. v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 301, 317 (1894); Litchfield v. Goodnow's Adm'r,
123 U.S. 549, 552 (1887). Consequently, the prior and subsequent litigation had
to involve the same parties or their privies.
Privity is used as the basis for imposing issue preclusion because it represents
that "the relationship between the one who is a party on the record and another
is close enough to include that other." Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419,
423 (3d Cir.) (Goodrich, J., concurring), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950); see IB
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fairness: since a stranger could not be bound by the prior adju-
dication, 48 it was thought to be somehow unfair to allow him to
claim the benefits of a prior adjudication. 49
After numerous commentators called for the demise of the mu-
tuality rule,5 0 Justice Traynor finally dispensed with it in Bernhard
v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n.5' The Bernhard
J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.411[1], at 392-96 (2d ed. 1984) (same) [hereinafter
J. MOORE]; RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 83-92 (1942) (describing situations in
which privity exists).
48. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits applying
issue preclusion against a litigant who was neither a party nor a privy in the prior
litigation because the litigant has not been afforded an opportunity to be heard.
See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 (1979); Blonder-Tongue,
402 U.S. at 329; Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940).
49. This alleged principle of unfairness has not found much support. See e.g.,
Parklane, 439 U.S. at 327 (mutuality based on premise that it was somehow unfair
to allow otherwise); Comment, Privity and Mutuality in the Doctine of Res Judicata,
35 YALE L.J. 607, 608-09 (1926) (mutuality based on "some supposed and unprovable
principle of 'natural' fairness") [hereinafter Comment, Privity and Mutuality].
50. For example, in 1843, Jeremy Bentham assailed the mutuality requirement:
There is reason for saying that a man shall not lose his cause in
consequence of the verdict given in a former proceeding to which he
was not a party; but there is no reason whatever for saying that he
shall not lose his cause in consequence of the verdict in the proceeding
to which he was a party, merely because his adversary was not.
J. BENTHAM, The Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM
171 (Bowring ed. 1843). For further criticism of the mutuality rule, see Comment,
The Requirement of Mutuality in Estoppel by Judgments, 29 ILL. L. REV. 93, 96
(1934); Recent Decisions, 27 VA. L. REV. 955, 956 (1941); Comment, Privity and
Mutuality, supra note 49, at 610-11.
51. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). In Bernhard, the first proceeding was
determined by a probate court. See id., 122 P.2d at 893. After objections and a hear-
ing, the probate court declared that the decedent had made a gift during her lifetime
to her executor. See id. at 807, 122 P.2d at 893. One of the objectors, Helen Bernhard,
who was appointed administratrix after the executor resigned, instituted a second
action against the bank, seeking to recover a deposit on the ground that the decedent
had not authorized the executor to withdraw it. See id.
The trial court gave judgment in favor of the bank, allowing the bank to invoke
the probate court's determination of the ownership of the money. See id., at 808, 122
P.2d at 894. Although the bank would not have been bound had there been an
unfavorable judgment in the first action, the California Supreme Court affirmed
the use of issue preclusion (the court referred to it as res judicata). See id. at 808, 122
P.2d at 894. Justice Traynor observed that "[n]o satisfactory rationalization has been
advanced for the requirement of mutuality. Just why a party who was not bound
by a previous action should be precluded from asserting it as res judicata against
a party who was bound by it is difficult to comprehend." Id. at 808, 122 P.2d
at 895. The court held that three questions, which were all answered in the affirmative
in Bernhard, were pertinent to determine the validity of a plea of issue preclusion:
Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one
presented in the action in question? Was there a final judgment on the
merits? Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in
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case involved the "defensive" use of issue preclusion-a new defend-
ant estopped the plaintiff from relitigating an issue the plaintiff had
previously litigated unsuccessfully in another action.5" Courts have
also allowed the "offensive" use of issue preclusion-a new plaintiff
estops the defendant from relitigating an issue the defendant pre-
viously litigated unsuccessfully in a prior action.53 To prevent any
unfairness that may result when a nonparty is allowed to preclude
a party from relitigating, two broad limitations have emerged: (1)
nonmutual issue preclusion can be defeated if the first action did
not provide a full and fair opportunity to litigate;5 4 and (2) courts
privity with a party to the prior adjudication?
Id. at 808, 122 P.2d at 895.
52. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). The Supreme Court of the United
States upheld the defensive use of issue preclusion twenty-five years later in Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971), thus
overruling Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936). Other cases have embraced the
Bernhard doctrine. See Preston v. United States, 696 F.2d 528, 542-43 (7th Cir.
1982); Gill & Duffus Servs., Inc. v. Nural Islam, 675 F.2d 404, 407 (D.C. Cir.
1982); Lujan v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 673 F.2d 1165, 1168 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969 (1982); Oldham v. Pritchett, 599 F.2d 274, 278-
80 (8th Cir. 1979); Cramer v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 267-68
(3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Lowell v. Twin Disc, Inc., 527
F.2d 767, 771 (2d Cir. 1975); Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Hogan, 476 F.2d
1182, 1187 (7th Cir. 1973); Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950).
53. See Speaker Sortation Sys. v. United States Postal Serv., 568 F.2d 46, 48-
49 (7th Cir. 1978); Garcy Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 496 F.2d 479, 483 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 843 (1974); Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59, 61-62 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971); Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co.
v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 88, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1969); Zdanok v.
Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 953-56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964);
Lange v. Heglund, 391 F. Supp. 128, 129-30 (W.D. Wash. 1974); United States
v. United Air Lines, 216 F. Supp. 709, 725-29 (E.D. Wash. 1962), aff'd on this
ground sub nom. United Air Lines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, 404 (9th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 143-
48, 225 N.E.2d 195, 196-99, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 597-602 (1967); Bahler v. Fletcher,
257 Or. 1, 474 P.2d 329 (1970).
54. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332-33 (1979) (since
petitioners "received a 'full and fair opportunity' to litigate their claims" in first
suit, petitioners are precluded from relitigating same questions in second suit);
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill.. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 333
(1971) (potentially estopped party may attempt to demonstrate that he did not have
" 'a fair opportunity procedurally, substantively and evidentially to pursue his
claim' " (quoting Eisel v. Columbia Packing Co., 181 F. Supp. 298, 301 (D. Mass.
1960.))).
The abrogation of the mutuality requirement rests on the premise that it is
untenable to afford a party more than one full and fair opportunity to relitigate
the same issues. See Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 328-29 ("[p]ermitting repeated
litigation of the same issue as long as the supply of unrelated defendants holds
out" represents misallocation of resources); Bernhard, 19 Cal. 2d at 808, 122 P.2d
at 895 (it is "unjust to permit one who has had his day in court to reopen identical
issues by merely switching adversaries").
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possess broad discretion to deny nonmutual preclusion in order to
protect against unfairness."
Today, nonmutual issue preclusion presumptively applies unless
the trial court finds that the application is unfair . 6 Courts have
necessarily determined this matter on a case-by-case basis. 7
55. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331 (granting trial courts "broad discretion to deter-
mine when offensive issue preclusion should apply); Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at
334 ("[i]n the end, decision will necessarily rest on the trial courts' sense of justice
and equity").
The Supreme Court in Parklane offered some examples to the lower courts of
when preclusion would be unfair. See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 330-31. The Parklane
Court acknowledged that its source for these examples was the Restatement (Second)
of Judgments. See id. at 330-31 nn.13-15. Section 29 of the Restatement (Second)
of Judgments enumerates a list of circumstances that might justify affording a party
an opportunity to relitigate:
A party precluded from relitigating an issue with an opposing party ...
is also precluded from doing so with another person unless the fact that
he lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action
or other circumstances justify affording him an opportunity to relitigate
the issue. The circumstances to which considerations should be given
include those enumerated in § 28 [exceptions to the general rule of
preclusion in mutual situations] and also whether:
(1) Treating the issue as conclusively determined would be incompatible
with an applicable scheme of administering the'remedies in the actions
involved;
(2) The forum in the second action affords the party against whom
preclusion is asserted procedural opportunities in the presentation and
determination of the issue that were not available in the first action and
could likely result in the issue being differently determined;
(3) The person seeking to invoke favorable preclusion, or to avoid
unfavorable preclusion, could have effected joinder in the first action
between himself and his present adversary;
(4) The determination relied on as preclusive was itself inconsistent with
another determination of the same issue;
(5) The prior determination may have been affected by relationships
among the parties to the first action that are not present in the subsequent
action, or apparently was based on a compromise verdict or finding;
(6) Treating the issue as conclusively determined may complicate deter-
mination of issues in the subsequent action or prejudice the interests of
another party thereto;
(7) The issue is one of law and treating it as conclusively determined
would inappropriately foreclose opportunity for obtaining reconsideration
of the legal rule upon which it was based;
(8) Other compelling circumstances make it appropriate that the party
be permitted to relitigate the issue.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 29. Comments to Section 29 indicate that
the circumstances enumerated do not exhaust all possible circumstances that a court
might consider, see id. § 29 comment j, nor are any of the circumstances dispositive
on the issue of preclusion. See id. § 29 comment b.
56. See IB J. MOORE, supra note 47, 0.441[3.-4], at 744.
57. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162 (1979) ("sole
remaining question is whether the particular circumstances of this case justify an
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IV. Issue Preclusion and Magistrates
A question of preclusion may arise when a nonparty to the prior
action seeks to estop a party from relitigating an issue that a
magistrate has determined. The following hypotheticals illustrate this
situation:5"
(1) A sues B for breach of contract. A and B properly consent
to have a federal magistrate try the case, thereby waiving their
rights to an article III judge. After both parties fully litigate,
final judgment is entered for B. Subsequently, A sues C for
inducing a breach of the contract that A made with B. The suit
between A and C is before a district court judge. C seeks to
estop A from relitigating the issue of whether there was a breach
of contract by invoking defensive issue preclusion.
(2) K and L, driver and passenger in a car, are hit by a car
driven by M. K sues M for injuries arising from M's negligence.
Both consent to have a magistrate try the case. Before the trial
starts, L, who was unable to join the action between K and M,
files suit in district court against M for injuries due to M's
negligence. The suit before the magistrate goes to trial first and,
after both parties fully litigate, the magistrate enters judgment
for K. L then seeks to estop M from relitigating the factual issue
of M's negligence by invoking offensive issue preclusion.
The trial court's final decision depends on the particular facts of,
each case.59 Nevertheless, an analysis of the parties' waiver and of
exception to general principles of estoppel") (emphasis added); Parklane, 439 U.S.
at 332 ("none of the considerations that would justify a refusal to allow the use
of offensive collateral estoppel is present in this case") (emphasis added); Western
Oil & Gas Ass'n. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 633 F.2d 803, 809-
10 (9th Cir. 1980) ("circumstances of each case must provide the touchstone for
decision") (emphasis added); Butler v. Stover Bros. Trucking Co., 546 F.2d 544,
551 (7th Cir. 1977) ("determination . . . depends upon a case by case analysis")
(emphasis added); Miller v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 538 F. Supp. 631, 632-
33 (D. Kan. 1982) (must examine "particular facts of the case") (emphasis added).
58. The fact patterns in the hypotheticals indicate that the cases are in federal
court. Assuming that these are diversity cases, the trial court must apply the state
rule on mutuality. See B.C.R. Transport Co. v. Fontaine, 727 F.2d 7, 11-12 (1st
Cir. 1984); Watkins v. M. & M. Tank Lines, Inc., 694 F.2d 309, 311-12 (4th Cir.
1982); Ritchie v. Landau, 475 F.2d 151, 154 (2d Cir. 1973); Vestal, Res Judicata/
Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied in Federal Courts, 66 MIcH. L. REv.
1723, 1728-33 (1968).
In Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983), the Supreme Court noted that
"mutuality has been for the most part abandoned" in cases involving issue pre-
clusion. Id. at 143. This Note assumes that the applicable state law has abandoned
the mutuality requirement.
59. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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the benefits, if any, of issue preclusion in this situation should guide
this determination.
A. Construing the Waiver
When a magistrate enters a final judgment and a nonparty seeks
to estop a party from relitigating based on this final judgment, a
trial court's inquiry should extend beyond whether the party had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate in the first suit.w0 In order to
apply issue preclusion, the district court in the later action should
also scrutinize the consent form signed by the party common to
both actions, A and M in the hypotheticals. The consent form
should be scrutinized because it embodies the parties' waiver of their
constitutional rights to an article III judge. 61 Courts carefully scru-
tinize waivers of constitutional rights in order to determine whether
the waiving party intentionally relinquished a known right. 62 Con-
sequently, the trial court should ascertain whether the common parties
validly waived article III adjudication of all issues the magistrate
decided, not only in the particular suit before the magistrate, but
also in subsequent litigation.
The parties must execute the consent form before a magistrate
can exercise his authority. 63 The federal form states, in pertinent
part, that:
In accordance with the provisions of [Section 636(c) of the Mag-
istrate Act], the parties to the above-captioned civil matter hereby
voluntarily waive their rights to proceed before a judge of the
United States district court and consent to have a United States
magistrate conduct any and all further proceedings in the case,
including trial, and order the entry of a final judgment.6
The language of the form is clear and unequivocal as to the
constitutional waiver in the first suit: the named parties waive their
right to a district court judge for the proceedings in that case. This
language, however, does not, on its face, amount to a waiver in
future suits. The United States Supreme Court has required that "a
waiver of constitutional rights in any context must, at the very least,
be clear. ' ' 65 It is well established that a court must closely scrutinize
60. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
61. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
63. See FED. R. Crv. P. Form 34.
64. Id.
65. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972) (emphasis in original).
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any waiver and indulge every reasonable presumption against it.66
In order for the waiver to be effective, a party must voluntarily
and knowingly waive a known right 67 with "sufficient awareness of
the relevant circumstances and likely consequences."
68
This high level of scrutiny is not confined to waivers of consti-
tutional rights in the criminal context, but extends to waivers in the
civil area as well. 69 Since the consent form apparently fails to warn
litigants of the far-reaching consequences that may result when they
relinquish their right to proceed before a district judge, the parties
may not have voluntarily and knowingly waived their rights to an
article III determination in future cases when they signed the consent
form. Because of this possible lack of awareness, a magistrate's
determination should not be the proper basis for issue preclusion.10
On the other hand, the resulting benefits of preclusion 7 1 may favor
altering the consent form so that it clearly indicates that the waiver
extends to all issues litigated.
66. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (waiver of right
to counsel); Bueno v. City of Donna, 714 F.2d 484, 492 (5th Cir. 1983) (waiver
of right to notice and hearing); Piankhy v. Cuyler, 703 F.2d 728, 730 (3d Cir.
1983) (waiver of right to counsel); United States v. Margiotta, 662 F.2d 131, 143
(2d Cir. 1981) (waiver of privilege against self-incrimination), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
913 (1983).
67. Numerous Supreme Court decisions require that a waiver of constitutional
rights be voluntary and knowing. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
748 (1970); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969); Miranda v.
United States, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966).
68. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
69. See D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972) (plaintiff
"voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly waived the rights it ... possessed to
prejudgment notice and hearing, and . . . it did so with full awareness of the legal
consequences" when it entered into contractual agreement); Mosley v. St. Louis
Southwestern Ry., 634 F.2d 942, 946 (5th Cir.) ("[w]hen considered against the
background of plaintiffs' limited formal education, their lack of legal experience
and the ambiguous circumstances under which the settlement agreements were signed,
this denial [of access to counsel] operates to vitiate the settlement agreements"),
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 906 (1981).
70. This conclusion stems from the fact that courts often scrutinize waivers to
ensure that the waiving party is aware of the rights he has waived and of the legal
consequences. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (contract provision giving
seller right to repossession did not waive buyer's procedural due process rights
partly because there was no proof that buyer was aware of purported waiver
provision); D. H. Overmyer, 405 U.S. at 187 (plaintiff corporation waived its rights
to pre-judgment notice and hearing "with full awareness of the legal consequences")
(emphasis added); United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731, 735-36 (8th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976) ("[ilt is possible . . . that the mere taking of the
[polygraph] examination is tantamount to a waiver of constitutional rights if ade-
quate warnings are givern") (emphasis added).
71. See infra notes 72-86 and accompanying text.
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B. The Benefits of Issue Preclusion
Courts justify issue preclusion on the ground that it: (1) conclu-
sively resolves disputes; (2) conserves judicial resources; (3) protects
the parties' adversaries from the expense and vexation of multiple
litigation; and (4) minimizes the possibility of inconsistent decisions. 72
The trial court should ascertain whether applying issue preclusion
to a magistrate's determination promotes these goals, and, if so,
whether the federal consent form should be altered so that the parties
are aware of the legal consequences of their consent to magistrate
adjudication.
1. Conclusive Resolution of Disputes-Finality
There is a strong interest in bringing a controversy to an end in
order to establish certainty in legal relations.7 Even if the prior
judgment is erroneous, both issue preclusion and claim preclusion
are applied for the sake of repose.74
Letting A and M retry the same issues in the subsequent litigation
will not alter the magistrate's determination of the first suit. Never-
theless, denying relitigation avoids subjecting the parties to incon-
sistent rulings. It also enables nonparties to order their future affairs
with the outcome of the first suit in mind.75
2. Conservation of Judicial Resources
If a court denies issue preclusion, one unwanted consequence is
that the trial judge will have to reconsider factual issues already
decided by the magistrate. The Supreme Court's decision in Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore76 manifests the strong public policy disfavoring
this result. The Court refused to allow relitigation of factual issues
that the petitioners had fully and fairly litigated in a prior proceeding,
72. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); Montana v. United States,
440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326
(1979).
73. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 129 (1983); Montana v. United
States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597
(1948).
74. See Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981); Reed v.
Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 199-201 (1932); Westwood Chem. Co. v. Kulick, 656 F.2d
1224, 1231 (6th Cir. 1981); Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d 265,
272 (2d Cir. 1977).
75. See 18 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 8, § 4403, at 16-17 (es-
tablishing repose for nonparties allows them to "breathe freer [and] direct their
future conduct according to the results of an adjudication between strangers").
76. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
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despite the petitioners' objection that use of issue preclusion violated
their seventh amendment right to a jury trial.77 The petitioners were
not entitled to a jury trial in the first suit because it was an equitable
injunctive action. In the subsequent legal action, however, the pe-
titioners had an opportunity to have the facts determined by a jury.
Nevertheless, the Court foreclosed the relitigation of factual issues
that had already been resolved.7" The Court reasoned that there was
"no further factfinding function for the jury to perform" since the
previous action had resolved common factual issues.79
If the trial court's factfinding function is not similarly limited
after a magistrate determines factual issues, disappointed litigants
such as A and M will seek retrial, hoping for a favorable judgment
on their second day in court. If critics of the Magistrate Act are
correct in their assertions that a magistrate may reach a result that
he thinks will please the district court because of the district court's
control, 0 the result reached in the second action may in fact be no
different than that obtained in the first. In any event, courts have
found that it is untenable to permit relitigation when parties have
already had a full opportunity in the prior suit."1 To hold otherwise
would frustrate the policies furthered by the use of issue preclusion.
77. See id. at 333-37. Petitoners' argument was based on the fact that the
seventh amendment is intended to preserve the right to jury trial as it existed in
1791. See id. at 335. Reference to the common law as it existed in 1791 indicates
that mutuality was required as a condition of issue preclusion. Consequently, the
petitioners contended that the use of issue preclusion unconstitutionally violated
their seventh amendment right to a jury trial since mutuality was absent. See id.
at 335. The Court, not persuaded by petitioners' argument, found that "many
procedural devices developed since 1791 ... have diminshed the civil jury's historic
domain" yet are not inconsistent with the seventh amendment. Id. at 336. The
seventh amendment was intended "to preserve the basic institution of jury trial in
only its most fundamental elements." Id. at 337 (quoting Galloway v. United States,
319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943)). Therefore, the Court noted, the law of issue preclusion,
which has evolved since 1791, does not violate the seventh amendment simply for
the reason that developments in issue preclusion, such as the absence of mutuality,
did not exist in 1791. See id.
78. See id. at 335-36.
79. See id. at 336.
80. See Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1053 (7th
Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., dissenting) (magistrates are beholden to judges); Pacemaker
Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 552-53 (9th
Cir.) (Schroeder, J., dissenting) (control by district judge prevents, rather than
preserves, independent decision making), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984);, Note,
Article III Constraints, supra note 6, at 1056-57 (magistrates "may be encouraged
to adopt a risk-averse strategy of adjudication by the pressure of judicial scrutiny");
cf. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 713 ("heart of
judicial independence ... is judicial individualism").
81. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of I11. Found.,
402 U.S. 313 (1971).
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Nevertheless, the application of issue preclusion may also produce
undesirable results. For example, litigants may refrain from relin-
quishing their right to an article III judge if they can be barred
from reasserting it on the same issues in future suits. If parties are
aware of the far-reaching consequences of the magistrate's decision
once issue preclusion applies, they may choose to litigate the first
suit more thoroughly. As a result, the magistrate system may be
beseiged with cautious if not overzealous litigants, thereby losing
some of the efficiency that it was developed to offer.8 2
3. Protection Against Multiple Lawsuits
The party benefiting from the use of nonmutual issue preclusion
is the one who has not yet litigated, and therefore generally does
not need protection from the expense and vexation of multiple
lawsuits.83 Nevertheless, both parties and courts may be spared the
harassment of having to litigate an issue that has already been
determined. If, for example, A in hypothetical (1) was denied the
opportunity to relitigate, there would be a significant conservation
of resources because little remains of the second claim. Nevertheless,
if the subsequent litigation involves different issues, in which case
the parties will still gain access to an article III judge, or if back-
ground information and necessary facts of the first suit must be
presented in the second suit, savings may be no more than minimal.84
82. Cf. Perschbacher, Rethinking Collateral Estoppel: Limiting the Preclusive
Effect of Administrative Determinations in Judicial Proceedings, 35 U. FLA. L.
REV. 422, 449 (1983) (increasing use of issue preclusion will likely result in investment
of additional time and expenses in first suit, consequently negating efficiency of
administrative decisionmaking) [hereinafter Perschbacher]; Note, Mutuality of Es-
toppel and the Seventh Amendment: The Effect of Parklane Hoisery, 64 CORNELL
L. REV. 1002, 1017-18 (1979) (same).
83. See Perschbacher, supra note 82, at 447.
84. Some courts have refused to apply nonmutual preclusion when it does not
significantly conserve the resources of the litigants or the court. See, e.g., Miller
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 538 F. Supp. 631, 634 (D. Kan. 1982) (preclusion
denied when plaintiff had to present same evidence in second case as was offered
in first trial in order to educate jury); Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp. v. Becker,
314 F. Supp. 1133, 1134 (D.D.C. 1970) (basic reason for applying issue preclusion,
to prevent relitigation, is absent because second case must be tried on closely related
issues and much of same evidence must be presented to jury); see also Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 355 & n.24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("ultimate
irony" of majority's decision permitting preclusion is that amount of savings is
doubtful at best because jury must still be impaneled, which causes much of the
delay, to determine amount of damages).
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4. Prevention of Inconsistent Decisions
If different results are reached when a matter is twice litigated,
disrespect for the legal system may follow.85 The confidence of the
district court, the legal profession, and the parties is essential if a
magistrate system is to succeed under a consensual framework.8 6
Any embarassment due to inconsistent decisions must be minimized
if a magistrate's effectiveness is to be maximized. A conflicting
decision will otherwise undermine the social importance of trust in
the magistrate, and frustrate reliance on a magistrate's dispute res-
olution if unhappy parties can relitigate issues already determined.
V. Recommendations
Decisions made by administrative agencies have often been the
basis of issue preclusion.87 Since the same principles of judicial
efficiency that support applying issue preclusion to judicial deter-
minations also justify applying it to quasi-judicial proceedings,88 this
expansion of issue preclusion occurs when the administrative forum
provides litigants with the essential procedural characteristics of a
court.89 The Supreme Court stated in United States v. Utah Con-
struction & Mining Co. that "[w]hen an administrative agency is
acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact
85. See 18 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 8, § 4403, at 12-13.
86. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 444, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in 1979
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1487, 1489.
87. See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982) (decision of
New York State Division of Human Rights was given preclusive effect); CIBA
Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 640, 644 (1973) (decision of Food and Drug
Administration); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402-04
(1940) (decision of National Bituminous Coal Commission); Long v. United States
Dep't of Air Force, 751 F.2d 339, 343-44 (10th Cir. 1984) (decision by presiding
official of the Merit Systems Protection Board); Korach v. Chicago Mercantile
Exch., 747 F.2d 414, 416 (7th Cir. 1984) (decision of Commodity Futures Trading
Commission); Anthan v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 672 F.2d 706,
709-10 (8th Cir. 1982) (decision by administrative law judge of United States
Department of Labor); Bowen v. United States, 570 F.2d 1311, 1320-23 (7th Cir.
1978) (decision of National Transportation Safety Board); Roberts v. American
Airlines, 526 F.2d 757, 760 (7th Cir.) (decision of Civil Aeronautics Board), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1975).
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 83 comment b ("public economy
and private repose resulting from the rule of issue preclusion generally are . . . as
important when an issue has been determined in an administrative tribunal as when
it has been determined by a court").
89. See id.; see also 18 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 8, § 4475, at
764-65 ("administrative decision commands preclusive effect only if it resulted from
a procedure that seems an adequate substitute for judicial procedure").
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properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity
to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to
enforce repose." 90
Issue preclusion has also been extended to arbitration awards when
the arbitration "affords opportunity for presentation of evidence
and argument substantially similar in form and scope to judicial
proceedings." 91 The institutional differences between courts and ar-
bitrators, however, have led courts to apply issue preclusion cau-
tiously in an arbitration context.
92
In light of the standards used by the courts in according preclusive
effect to these actions, it can be strongly urged that issue preclusion
should also apply to a magistrate's determination. The parties' con-
sent to have a magistrate preside over the trial does not waive the
jurisdiction of the district court.93 Instead, the parties are choosing
one judicial officer within the district court over another. 94 As a
result, the same rules and statutes that bind proceedings in a district
court govern the civil trial before a magistrate.95 Moreover, mag-
istrates presiding over consensual civil trials are vested with all of
the judicial power of an article III judge except the power to punish
for contempt of court. 96 Consequently, the similarities between both
90. 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966).
91, RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 8, § 84 comment c. For court decisions
giving preclusive effect to arbitration awards, see Ritchie v. Landau, 475 F.2d 151(2d Cir. 1973); Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 534 F. Supp. 69
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Barnes v. Oody, 514 F. Supp. 23 (E.D. Tenn. 1981); Eagle
Transport Ltd. v. O'Connor, 470 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
92. See 18 WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 8, § 4475; see also Vestal,
supra note 8, at 881 ("only in a very limited situation is preclusiveness to be
accorded to an issue decided by an arbitrator's award").
93. See Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922, 926 (3d Cir. 1983).
94. See id.; PRACTICE BEFORE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES, supra note 45, § 2.01
("magistrate is a subordinate judicial officer of the district court").
95. PRACTICE BEFORE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES, supra note 45, § 2.01 (Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Federal Rules
of Evidence are applicable to proceedings before both magistrates and judges).
96. In Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1984),
the majority of the court stated:
The vesting of this power [to punish for contempt of court] exclusively
in the hands of Article III judicial officers would seem .. .to provide
an adequate distinction between such judges and non-Article III officers.
This clear line [of demarcation between the power of an Article III
officer and a magistrate] also serves to limit the ultimate exercise of
judicial power to persons enjoying the constitutional guarantee of in-
dependence.
Id. at 1044. Judge Posner, not persuaded by the majority's emphasis on the
reservation of this power for article III judges, characterized in a dissenting opinion
the contempt power "about as crucial as the [federal judge's] robe." Id. at 1049
(Posner, J., dissenting).
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adjudication procedures and powers of a magistrate and a judge
indicate that preclusion would be proper.
Failure to permit issue preclusion after a magistrate has made a
final factual determination unreasonably affords litigants the op-
portunity of getting a second opinion on issues already fully litigated.
This result would have the effect of rendering magistrates less useful
to district courts than they were intended to be, since a district
court judge will have to retry issues that have already been con-
clusively determined by a magistrate. 97 Correlatively, opening the
door to possible inconsistent decisions would undermine the public
esteem needed if the magistrate system is to succeed. 9
Even if the objective requirements for the application of issue
preclusion have been satisfied, however, lower courts still have broad
discretion to deny preclusion in order to prevent any unfairness. 99
Unfairness in these cases exists unless parties are explicitly told of
all the consequences of their consent. Otherwise, the parties' waiver
of their rights to an article III judge extends further than is embodied
in the federal consent form. The strong public policy compelling
the fair application of nonmutual issue preclusion'0° juxtaposed with
the courts' rigid requirement of a voluntary and intelligent waiver
of constitutional rights'0 ' seems to outweigh any benefits from the
use of issue preclusion.
The consent form should not be a trap for the unwary. Instead,
it should adequately notify parties that they may be barred from
having issues redetermined by an article III judge once a magistrate
decides the issues. If the language of the consent form clearly
indicates that the parties are waiving article III adjudication of all
issues raised, even if the issues arise in subsequent suits, then allowing
preclusion would comport with public policy surrounding waivers.
In addition, an overworked district judge will not have to retry
issues that a factfinder has already determined. Finally, this proposal
will enable courts to continue the current practice of applying issue
preclusion when it is appropriate.
VI. Conclusion
The use of federal magistrates in a consensual civil trial has been
greeted with overwhelming approval. Concurrently, the requirement
97. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
98. See supranotes 85-86 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.101. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
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of mutuality as a precondition for the use of issue preclusion has
largely been abandoned. Consequently, a nonparty in a subsequent
action may wish to invoke a magistrate's factual determination in
order to estop a party from relitigating identical issues before an
article III judge. Permitting issue preclusion can occur only if the
waiver of a constitutional right is interpreted broadly. Rather than
having to resort to a broad interpretation, which may not be justified,
the federal consent form encompassing the waiver should be altered
so that parties are aware of the exact ramifications of their consent.
In this way, reliance on a magistrate's dispute resolution can be
sustained, and even strengthened.
Allison G. Danzig

